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i 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Court in its order of May 9, 1985 
committed reversible error in ruling that Plaintiff was not a 
partner of the Winecup Ranch and, therefore, entitled to one-half 
(1/2) of the distribution from the partnership share of 
Defendant-Appellant Monte D. Tipton. 
2. Whether the Court committed reversible error in 
finding that there was no factual basis or change of 
circumstances sufficient to mandate the reallocation of debts and 
obligations, including those owed to the Internal Revenue 
Service. 
3. Whether the Court committed reversible error in 
failing to grant Defendant's MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; TO TAKE 
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY; TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW; AND TO AMEND JUDGMENT. 
ii 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
48-1-4, UCA. In determining whether a partnership 
exists these rules shall apply: 
(1) Except as provided by section 48-1-13, persons who are 
not partners as to each other are not partners as to third 
persons. 
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by 
entireties, joint property, common property, or part ownership, 
does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-
owners do or do not share any profits made by the use of the 
property. 
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself 
establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them 
have a joint or common right or interest in any property from 
which the returns are derived. 
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a 
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the 
business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits 
were received in payment: 
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise. 
(b) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a 
deceased partner. 
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a 
deceased partner. 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment 
vary with the profits of the business. 
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will of 
a business or other property by installments or otherwise. 
48-1-13, UCA. (1) When a person by words spoken or 
written or by conduct represents himnself, or consents to 
another's representing him, to anyone as a partner, in an 
existing partnership or with one or more persons not actual 
partners, he is liable to any such person to whom such 
representation has been made who has on the faith of such 
representation given credit to the actual or apparent 
partnership, and, if he has made such representation or consented 
to its being made in a public manner, he is liable to such 
person, whether the representation has or has not been made or 
communicated to such person so giving credit by, or with the 
knowledge of, the apparent partner making the representation or 
consenting to its being made. 
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as 
if he were an actual member of the partnership. 
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable 
jointly with the other persons, if any, so consenting to the 
contract or representation as to incur liability; otherwise, 
separately. 
iii 
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a 
partner in an existing partnership, or with one or more persons 
not actual partners, he is an agent of the persons consenting to 
such representation to bind them to the same extent and in the 
same manner as though he were a partner in fact, with respect to 
persons who rely upon the representation. Where all the members 
of an existing partnership consent to the representation, a 
partnership act or obligation results; but in all other cases it 
is the joint act or obligation of the person acting and the 
persons consenting to the representation. 
iv 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an appeal from orders entered on May 
9, 1985 and May 20, 1986. 
Plaintiff Mrs. Tipton had sought the Court's help to 
cause Defendant to discharge tax liens on real property she 
received as part of her property settlement. 
Mr. Tipton then sought a modification of the Decree of 
Divorce originally entered on March 4, 1983 and other relief, 
including reallocation of marital debt, a re-distribution of the 
marital property and other relief. 
The Court denied Mr. Tipton's request for relief, 
resulting in the instant appeal. 
II 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The parties to this action were married on October 29, 
1978 in Elko, Nevada. During their marriage the parties adopted 
two (2) children, to-wit: Azelia Tipton, a female, born May 12, 
1981 and Stephen Tyrel Tipton, a male, born December 13, 1981. 
The decree of divorce (R, 23-29), entered March 4, 
1983, was based on the stipulation of.the parties and provided, 
inter alia, for the distribution of a large amount of personal 
1 
and real property. Specifically, Mrs. Tipton received the 
parties' residence at 1839 Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah 
subject to any encumbrances; a trout farm in the State of 
Missouri theretofore owned jointly by the parties; and other 
items of personal property, including $77,000.00 in cash. In 
addition, Plaintiff was granted the following: 
A fifty percent (50%) partnership share of 
the balance due to the parties hereto from 
the Sierra Pacific note, said fifty percent 
share to be paid directly to plaintiff as the 
funds are received by L. Darrell Christensen. 
(R. 27) 
The Sierra Pacific Note is an obligation payable to the 
partnership from the purchase of real property in Nevada known as 
the Winecup Ranch. Mrs. Tipton alleged prior to the original 
divorce settlement that she was a partner, and it was upon this 
basis that the fifty percent share was based. 
Mr. Tipton was ordered to pay all joint debts incurred 
prior to the parties' separation on May 1, 1982 and each party 
was to pay his or her own debts incurred thereafter. 
On September 21, 1986 Plaintiff initiated proceedings 
against Mr. Tipton by Order to Show Cause (R, 35-36), alleging 
that Mr. Tipton had contemptuously failed to pay tax liens on the 
real property at 1839 Logan Avenue, allegedly arising out of tax 
obligations incurred by Mr. Tipton during the respective taxable 
years of 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982. Mr. Tipton responded to the 
Order to Show cause on October 25, 1984 with his VERIFIED MOTION 
TO DISMISS ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE; FOR CONTEMPT; FOR JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFF; AND FOR OTHER RELIEF (R, 39-45). Mr. Tipton 
alleged that there was no factual basis for the order to show 
cause and that Plaintiff herself was in contempt for failure to 
allow visitation; that Plaintiff had converted $11,000.00 of 
Defendant's money payable to Defendant from the cashing of a 
whole life insurance policy; that Plaintiff had incurred debts in 
Mr. Tipton's name of $5,000.00 on a charge card; and that 
Defendant was entitled to a Court order requiring Plaintiff to 
execute a written agreement setting forth the terms of a pre-
divorce oral agreement. 
Defendant then filed as a separate document his 
PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE (R, 49-52) on February 25, 
1985, wherein he sought the following relief: 
1. to alter the distribution of marital property, 
2. to re-allocate the debts and obligations of the 
marriage, including IRS obligations; 
3. to change custody of the parties1 minor children 
to Defendant or to require that Plaintiff post a cash bond of 
$50,000 to insure Defendant's visitation; and 
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4. that funds earmarked for deposit in a trust for 
the benefit of the children be paid to an independent trustee, 
and not to Plaintiff. 
Defendant alleged in support of his petition to modify 
substantially changed circumstances, including malicious failure 
to allow visitation; the squandering of substantial sums of cash 
money to the detriment of the children and the lack of intent to 
create the children's trusts as mandated by the decree of 
divorce; the remarriage of Plaintiff; and the tax consequences of 
the decree of divorce, which were unknown and unascertainable by 
Defendant at the time of the divorce. 
The pending matters were heard before Commissioner 
Sandra N. Peuler on January 24, 1985, resulting in a 
recommendation (R, 59-60) to which Defendant objected. On March 
21, 1985 (April 5, 1985) the foregoing matters were heard before 
James S. Sawaya, District Judge. Counsel stipulated that the 
evidence could be proffered. Therefore, no sworn testimony was 
taken, either from the parties themselves or from their 
respective expert witnesses. The Court's memorandum decision of 
April 26, 1985 and the order entered thereafter on May 9, 1985 
(R, 119-120) provided, insofar as is pertinent hereto, as 
follows: 
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1. f!. . . that the defendant Monte Tipton should be 
required to pay the tax liabilities associated with the tax 
returns for 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982." 
2. ". . . that the plaintiff is entitled to and the 
Court awards her a judgment against the defendant for the sum of 
$113,601.98, and further that the defendant be required to remove 
the liens on the residence of the parties on Logan Avenue." 
3. "With regard to issue number 4, the Court finds 
that the plaintiff is not a partner of the Winecup Ranch and that 
she is entitled to a 1/2 of the distributions from the 
partnership share of Monte Tipton." 
4. "With regard to issue number 6, the Court finds a 
[sic] factual basis on which to allocate or reallocate the debts 
and obligations incurred during the marriage including the 
obligations to the IRS." 
On May 20, 1985 Defendant filed his MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL; TO TAKE ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY; TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; AND TO AMEND JUDGMENT (R, 123-126) based 
upon the following: 
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1. misrepresentations at the trial on the part of 
Plaintiff which prevented Defendant from having a fair trial, 
including documentary evidence not in Defendant's possession 
which reflects that Plaintiff assumed certain IRS obligations 
legally; 
2. the Court's ruling stating that Defendant could 
reasonably have known all relevant facts at the time the 
stipulation was entered into was against the weight of the 
evidence; 
3. the Court's ruling was inconsistent and unfair in 
that it found no factual basis to modify the decree and then did 
just that relative to the partnership share of the Winecup Ranch 
and the IRS obligations; and 
4. the Court denied Defendant an opportunity to 
object to costs incurred by Plaintiff for her accountant. 
The Court denied Defendant's motion in its entirety by 
order entered on May 20, 1986 [erroneously designated May 20, 
1985] (R, 149-150). 
This appeal followed, filed June 13, 1986 (R, 151-152), 
where Mr. Tipton seeks relief from the trial court's orders of 
May 9, 1985 and May 20, 1986, respectively. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant-Apellant argues that the Court made no 
written findings of fact as required by Rule 52(a) to support 
either its order of May 9, 1985 or its order of May 20, 1986. 
Both orders should be overturned on that basis alone. 
Mr. Tipton also argues, however, that even without 
findings of fact required under Rule 52(a), both decisions of the 
trial court were against the weight of the evidence. In this 
regard Mr. Tipton argues that this Court must find as a matter of 
law, contrary to the trial Court's order of May 9, 1985, that a 
partnership existed between Mr. and Mrs. Tipton as to the Winecup 
Ranch property and the proceeds of its sale. Furthermore, Mr. 
Tipton urges this Court to find as a matter of law that the 
evidence presented in support of Mr. Tipton's petition to modify 
of February 22, 1985 constituted a substantial change of 
circumstances, mandating a modification of the decree. 
Finally, Mr. Tipton argues that the trial Court's 
denial of his motion for a new trial to allow additional 
testimony; to amend findings of fact and conclusions of law; and 
to amend judgment was reversible error. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
It is recognized that on appeal that the trial court 
has broad discretion and that there is a presumption of validity 
to its rulings. Boals v. Boals, Utah, 664 P.2d 1191 (1983); 
Argyle v. Argyle, Utah, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (1984); and Savage v. 
Savage, Utah, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1983). 
The burden here is for Defendant/Appellant to show 
either that the evidence adduced at the trial clearly 
preponderates against the court's findings or that the court's 
ruling was an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Thompson, Utah, 21 
UAR 18, 19 (1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 1218 
(1980); and Turner v. Turner, Utah, 649 P.2d 6 (1982) 
II 
THE COURT'S FINDING AND ORDER 
THAT CELIA SHERWOOD TIPTON IS NOT A PARTNER 
OF MONTE DEE TIPTON IN THE WINECUP RANCH 
CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR 
1. The Court's "findings" on the existence or non-
existence of a partnership are wholly inadequate. The Court, in 
its memorandum decision of April 16, 1985 made as its sole 
finding on the issue of the existence or non-existence of a 
partnership between Mr. and Mrs. Tipton the following: 
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With regard to issue number 4, the Court 
finds that the plaintiff is not a partner of 
the Winecup Ranch and that she is entitled to 
a 1/2 of the distribution from the 
partnership share of Monte Tipton. 
The foregoing fTfindingn was set forth in its exact form 
in the findings of fact and conclusions of law, f6. (R, 116) 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereafter 
"URCP,11 requires the Court to state the facts upon which a 
judgment is based as follows: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury . . . the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, . . . 
Rule 52(b), URCP, provides the vehicle through which 
the court may amend its original findings or make new findings as 
follows: 
Upon motion of a party made not later than 
ten days after entry of judgment the court 
may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. 
In this case, the judge did neither, which constitutes 
reversible error. With regard to the sufficiency of findings of 
fact, in matters relating to issues with substantial economic 
ramifications, this Court has unequivocally stated in the case of 
Montoya v. Montoya, 2 UAR 7 (1985) at 7-8 as follows: 
It is essential that such determinations be 
based on proper findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
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Furthermore, this Court in Montoya at 8 reiterated that 
the requirements of Rule 52(a), URCP apply to domestic actions 
for modification, citing as authoritative its earlier decision in 
Stoddard v. Stoddard, Utah, 642 P.2d 743, 744 (1982). 
This Court has even more recently discussed the 
requirements that proper findings of fact be promulgated by the 
trial judge in the case of Smith v. Smith, 43 UAR 5 (1986). 
Although the issue on appeal in the Smith case was that of 
custody, the requirements regarding adequate findings are equally 
applicable in this case. The Smith Court stated at 6 that 
To ensure that the trial Court's custody 
determination, discretionary as it is, 
[citing] Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 
at 41, is rationally based, it is essential 
that the Court set forth in its findings of 
fact not only that it finds one parent to be 
the better person to care for the child, but 
also the basic facts which show why that 
ultimate conclusion is justified. [emphasis 
in original] 
The Court at 6 and 7 further explained that the 
ultimate conclusion be the logical result of and supported by, 
evidence and applicable controlling legal principles, without 
which the Appellate Court cannot discharge its review function. 
The "findings'1 in this case, if indeed they rise to 
that level, suffer from the same inadequacies as those of the 
Smith case. There is no citation of "basic facts" by the Court 
10 
to support its conclusion that Celia Sherwood Tipton was not a 
partner in the Winecup Ranch. There exists only the conclusion, 
with no factual support whatsoever, for this Court to review. 
2. The evidence adduced at trial mandates that this 
Court recognize a partnership between Mr. and Mrs. Tipton 
relative to the Sierra Pacific note. A partnership may arise in 
at least three (3) different ways, to-wit: (1) by express 
contract; (2) by implied contract; or (3) by estoppel. Yoder v. 
Hooper, Colo. App.,a 695 P.2d 1182 (1984); 48-1-4, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), hereafter "UCA;" and 48-1-13, UCA. 
Furthermore, a partnership may legally exist between 
husband and wife. As the United States Supreme Court stated in 
Commissioner v. Tower, 327 US 280, 290; 90 L.Ed. 67; 66 S.Ct. 532 
(1946), 
There can be no question that a wife and a 
husband may, under certain circumstances, 
become partners for tax, as for other 
purposes. 
It is the position of Monte D. Tipton that a 
partnership existed as a matter of law between himself and his 
ex-wife, either expressly, implied in law or by estoppel, and 
that it was error for the court to find otherwise. 
The record reveals the following information, and only 
the following information, relating to the existence of non-
existence of a partnership: 
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1. The original decree of divorce of February 8, 
1983, which provides that Plaintiff receive: 
A fifty percent (50%) partnership share of 
the balance due to the parties hereto from 
the Sierra Pacific note, said fifty percent 
share to be paid directly to plaintiff as the 
funds are received by L. Darrell Christensen. 
2. The parties1 stipulation of October 22, 1982, 
which contains language identical to the foregoing. 
3. The following evidence proffered at trial: 
a. Statements of Richard B. McKeown, Plaintiff's 
attorney, proffered as testimony on behalf of Plaintiff: 
[t]here was a claim that Sarah [sic] Tipton 
is a general partner. We have denied that, 
seeing no documentation to the effect that 
she is. (R, 159 L 5-7) 
Now, issue number four asks this Court to 
determine whether or not Celia is a partner 
of the Winecup Ranch. I do not believe that 
she is a partner but I don't believe they 
have documentation to prove one way or 
another whether she is a partner of the 
Winecup Ranch. Our position is that pursuant 
to the decree she is only entitled to one-
half of a particular distribution from a 
partnership, that she did not sign a 
partnership agreement, that she cannot be 
made a partner simply by acquiescence of 
other parties and that we have in this decree 
as property settlement not a partnership 
interest that's created, and I think we will 
leave that at that because I, again, don't 
think there are documents sufficient to 
warrant the Court in making that decision. 
We don't have any signed partners. The 
partners don't know if they exist. (R, 12 L 
8-22) 
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The concept of the de facto general 
partnership is one that is difficult for me 
to handle. A partnership requires 
acquiescence by partners. It is not 
something that occurs spontaneously. It is 
not something that occurs by order of the 
Court. What the Court has to deal with is 
property distribution. I don't think that by 
implication or otherwise the Court can 
require that Celia become a general partner 
in a property or in any partnership of any 
kind. It's her impression that she never 
signed a partnership agreement. I think that 
is refuted but nothing has been produced to 
indicate that she did. It is our position 
that she is not in fact a partner, in fact, 
upon receipt of a K-l for 1983, the first tax 
year, she received a K-l. She indicated that 
she felt she was not a partner and subsequent 
to that we have written a letter to the other 
general partner, Darrell Christensen, 
indicating we do not believe she is a 
partner. (R, 178 L 20 - R, 179 L 11) 
. . . I think the partnership requires also 
Celia Tipton's acquiescence. She has 
indicated she didn't want to be involved with 
the partnership. I suggest that this involved 
more than one note, as many as seventy-one or 
seventy-two notes. She participates in no 
other notes, only in the Sierra Pacific note. 
(R, 182 L 1-7) 
b. Statements of Peter W. Guyon, Defendant's 
attorney, proffered as testimony on behalf of Defendant and 
Defendant's expert witness William G. Gibson: 
Now, the issue of partnership shares has been 
brought up. I refer to Mr. McKeown's 
schematic drawing of the Winecup Ranch 
partnership which we do not agree with. In 
the first place, I am lead to believe in the 
Winecup Ranch partnership--I don't have any 
documents either, Your Honor, but I don't 
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think there necessarily have to be documents. 
I think that plaintiff is, if nothing else, 
she is a de facto general partner by virtue 
of the fact that not only did she enter into 
the stipulation and settlement agreement 
accepting a fifty-percent partnership share 
but also by accepting and filing—that was 
given to her there with a K-l form which is 
to be filed by partners of the partnership. 
She did, it is my understanding, filed those 
K-l forms out of the distributed share from 
the fall of 1981 or previously. (R, 175 L 9-
22) 
I stand corrected on that issue. Issue 
number five, at the time the funds were 
placed in the trust, he had rights of 
ownership in them. It is our position that 
not only does the settlement agreement 
reflect de facto partnership, not only 
written partnership, the divorce decree does. 
She received the funds, some of those funds, 
filed the K-l form to reflect the receipt of 
the payment and and (sic) I think that the 
issue of whether or not—whether they were 
her funds or whoever (sic) they were, I am 
not sure if that is even correct or whether 
that is important but certainly she received 
a partnership share and was, if nothing else, 
a de facto partner. (R, 177 L 11-22) 
If I could quickly respond to these last two 
things that may put this to rest. 
Acquiescence of partners, Mr. McKeown has 
stated it takes acquiescence of partners to 
make a partner. We have acquiescence of 
Darrell Christensen and Mr. Tipton and Keith 
Christensen. We have nothing before the 
Court and no sign of anything that indicates 
anything other than acquiescense to that very 
same thing that Mr. Christensen was 
specifically advised by Mr. Tipton that he 
was giving her a partnership share. He 
acquiesced in that. (R, 180 L 19 - R, 181 L 
3) 
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Let me make one short statement on 6 and I 
will be ready to go. I haven't had an 
opportunity to address that. That is on the 
one hand Mr. McKeown is attempting to assert 
and hide behind the provisions of the decree 
but on the other side attempts to find that 
Mrs. Tipton was not a partner in these 
amounts that have been paid, thereby 
attempting to change the tax liability and I 
will point out to the Court--at least my 
understanding is that if she is not a general 
partner then the tax liability falls upon Mr. 
Tipton. If she is a partner, which she has 
acquiesced to be, then the tax liability 
falls upon her. I am not sure the Court 
understands the ramifications of that. (R, 
185 L 18 - R, 186 L 4) 
Accordingly, the issue of the existence or non-
existence of the partnership must succeed or fail on the 
foregoing facts alone. It is Defendant's allegation that the 
only competent evidence on the record mandates the existence of 
the alleged partnership. 
Under Utah Law, UCA 48-1-4 sets forth various rules to 
be used in determining the existence or non-existence of a 
partnership. In fact, a presumption arises under 48-1-4(4) that 
a partnership exists under the following circumstances: 
(4) the receipt by a person of a share of the 
profits of a business is prima facie evidence 
that he is a partner in the business, . . . 
In this case, the "business" was the purchase and 
resale of the Winecup Ranch. The Sierra Pacific Note and the 
proceeds thereof are the profits of said business. In fact, the 
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stipulation and decree clearly establish both points. They both 
provide that Plaintiff receive a partnership share of the 
balance due to the parties . . ." [emphasis added] The clear 
meaning and intent of this language has been misconstrued, 
resulting in the present appeal. 
Accordingly, the law presumes that Mrs. Tipton is a 
partner by virtue of her receipt of shares of the profits of a 
business, (See also Kimball v. McCormick, Utah, 259 P.313 (1927)) 
Mr. Tipton does not argue that the presumption cannot be 
rebutted, but only that it has not been so rebutted as a matter 
of law. 
None of the proffered evidence really adds substantial 
competent information, other than to deny and allege, 
respectively, the existence of a partnership. The thrust of Mr. 
McKeown's proffer is that in the absence of documents, there is 
no partnership, which is not a correct statement of the law in 
any event. If anything, Mr. McKeown's statement that Plaintiff 
received a K-l [Partnership Return] for 1983 relating to funds 
received by Plaintiff from the Sierra Pacific Note (R, 179 1,5-7) 
support the proposition she was a partner. That Plaintiff filed 
the K-l (R, 175 L 20-22) is undisputed. Thus, the only competent 
evidence is that there was a partnership, and the trial Court's 
finding otherwise is clear error. 
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If this Court does not find a partnership by the 
express agreement of the parties, the Court should imply the 
existence of one. This Court, in Bridgman v. Winsniss, Utah, 98 
p.186 (1908) stated at 189: 
The rule is well settled that the existence 
of a partnership may be implied from the 
circumstances, . . . 
In the case of Yoder v. Hooper, Colo.App., 695 P.2d 
1182 (1984), the Court defined partnership at 1187 as: 
. . . an express or implied contract between 
two or more persons to place their money, 
skill, effects or labor into a business and 
to share profits and losses. [citations 
omitted] Further, no express agreement is 
necessary; rather, a partnership may be 
formed by the conduct of the parties, 
[citations omitted.] 
The law of implied contracts is generally expressed in 
17 Am Jur 2d Contracts §255 as follows: 
Therefore, whatever may fairly be implied 
from the terms or nature of an instrument is, 
in the eyes of the law, contained in it. The 
law will imply a contractual obligation and 
enforce it if it is a necessary implication 
from the provisions of the instrument, or, in 
a proper case, from the language and 
circumstances of the agreement; and what is 
implied in law need not be expressed. 
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The only competent evidence before the trial court was 
that a partnership existed, either expressly or impliedly. The 
only information countering that proposition are the allegations 
of Richard B. McKeown that "since there are no papers there is no 
partnership." (R, 169) 
As has been discussed above, the intention of the 
parties expressed that Mrs. Tipton was receiving a partnership 
interest; it did not say that she was to receive one-half of Mr. 
Tiptonfs share. The document filed by Mr. Tipton in his motion 
for new trial, etc. likewise casts significant doubt on Mrs. 
Tipton's denial of a partnership. Since it is clear the basic 
reasons for the partnership was to allocate one-half of the tax 
consequence as to Mrs. Tipton and one-half to Mr. Tipton, Mrs. 
Tipton's acceptance of that liability is certainly germane, if 
not entirely dispositive. 
If the Court does not find a partnership expressed or 
implied, it must find a partnership by estoppel. The doctrine of 
partnership by estoppel is set forth in 68 CJS 49, Partnership, 
§21, as follows: 
In actions between alleged copartners the 
doctrine of estoppel will be applied where 
one of the parties has repudiated or 
abandoned the agreement and subsequently 
endeavors to take advantage of it, or, having 
accepted and acted on an agreement to form a 
partnership, now seeks to disclaim the 
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relationship. Persons who have admitted 
expressly or by conduct, that they are 
partnerships will be held to that admission. 
This general proposition is recognized in this State in 
the provisions of 48-1-13, UCA, as follows: 
(1) When a person by words spoken or by 
conduct represents himself, or consents to 
another's representing him, to anyone as a 
partner in an existing partnership or with 
one or more persons not actual partners, he 
is liable to any such person whom such 
representation has been made who has on the 
faith of such representation given credit to 
the actual or apparent partnership, . . . 
It is recognized that no third party has been extended 
"credit" on the basis of apparent partnership. However, the 
principle of estoppel can and should apply in relations between 
alleged or apparent partners. The basis of estoppel is the 
misleading of another by acts or representations upon which one 
relies to his detriment. Mr. Tipton has relied to his detriment 
in the same fashion and has relied to his detriment on the 
apparent partnership, and the Court should find a partnership by 
estoppel between Mr. and Mrs. Tipton. 
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Ill 
THE COURTS RULING ON THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
BY DEFENDANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
OF FEBRUARY 22, 1985 WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
1. The court's ruling was unsupported by adequate 
findings as required by Rule 52(a), URCP. As has been discussed 
above, Rule 52(a), URCP, requires adequate written findings to 
support the conclusions and rulings of the court. In this case, 
the court made the following "finding" on the modification issues 
as a group: 
Those facts upon which defendant relies as a 
basis for and grounds to modify the decree 
are facts which this court believes could 
have, with reasonable diligence, been 
discovered and produced at the time the 
decree was entered. (R, 115) 
The finding is in itself only a conclusion, and nothing 
else. It suffers from the same inadequacies as the court's 
"finding," discussed in detail above, that there was no 
partnership between Mr. and Mrs. Tipton. There simply is no 
written, logical and factual statement which leads to and 
supports the court's decision and conclusion. Accordingly, the 
ruling relating to the issues of modification must be overturned. 
2. The only competent evidence before the trial court 
mandated the court's finding of a substantial change of 
circumstances. The substance of Mr. Tipton's petition to modify, 
insofar as it is relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, is 
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that the tax consequences of the original divorce decree were 
unknown to defendant at the time the stipulation leading to the 
divorce was executed, that they could not have been known to him; 
and that the ramifications thereof have devastated Mr. Tipton. 
(R, 51) The fact they were unknown and not within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of the divorce 
constitutes the basis for Mr. Tipton's allegations of a 
substantial change of circumstances. 
In support of his contentions Mr. Tipton caused to be 
proffered at the trial his testimony and that of William G. 
Gibson, Mr. Tipton's accountant during the period in question. 
Mr. Gibson, who was present in the court, was an experienced CPA, 
having had 15 years1 experience. (R 19, L 8-12) The proffered 
testimony of Gibson and Mr. Tipton is that Mr. Tipton came to 
Gibson in 1981 for help with Mr. Tipton's income tax returns. 
Mr. Tipton had had another CPA previously, i.e., Gail Parsons, in 
whose possession the relevant documents had been deposited. 
Because of the latter?s severe medical problems, however, Mr. 
Tipton was unable to get the records from Parsons which were 
needed by Gibson to complete the returns. Likewise, Gibson had a 
great deal of difficulty, and literally tried for 1\ to 2 years 
before getting information sufficient to file the returns for 
1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982. The result of Mr. Tipton's tax 
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problems was that he owed over $211,000 to the IRS instead of the 
$122,000 he had planned on. (R 173, L 9 - R 174, L 12) Mr. 
Tipton's actual tax obligation was approximately $88,000 higher 
than he had anticipated at the time of the divorce. (R 174, L 2-
12) 
Mr. McKeown attempted to refute the testimony of Mr. 
Tipton and Mr. Gibson by proffering the testimony of Richard C. 
Seamons, Mrs. Tipton's CPA. (R 177, L 23 - R 178, L 4) However, 
since Seamons was Mrs. Tipton's CPA and had no contact with or 
knowledge of the preparation of the tax returns or the problems 
involved in getting the information necessary to file the same, 
Mr. Seamons' "knowledge" is without foundation and cannot be 
considered by the court. It remains, then, that the only 
competent evidence on the record was that proffered by Mr. Tipton 
and Mr. Gibson, and the court was bound to rely upon it. Its 
failure to do so is reversible error. 
This court has recognized the validity of Mr. Tipton's 
position in its recent case of Thompson v. Thompson, Utah, 21 UAR 
18 (1985). In Thompson the ex-wife sought to modify the decree 
of divorce to add a debt to her ex-husband's obligations which 
had not been considered at the time of the divorce. Although the 
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trial court did not specifically state or find that a 
"substantial change of circumstances" had taken place, this court 
upheld the lower courtTs ruling and found at 19 that 
[the trial court's] findings and supporting 
evidence are sufficient indicia in this case 
that such a substantial change had taken 
place since the decree, which was not within 
the original contemplation of the parties or 
the court at the time the original decree was 
rendered. 
Accordingly, the fact that the tax consequences of the 
settlement agreement and the resulting decree of divorce were not 
in the contemplation of the parties — or the court, for that 
matter—constitute a substantial change of circumstances 
sufficient to allow the court to consider a modification of the 
original decree of divorce. The fact that the court did not do 
so under the facts of this case is reversible error. 
IV 
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS 
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL; TO TAKE 
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY; TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW; AND TO AMEND JUDGMENT 
The Court denied Defendant's motion of May 20, 1985 
without any findings whatsoever. (R, 136) As such, the order 
violates the mandates of Rule 52(a), URCP as well as the case 
authorities cited above. 
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The substance of Defendant's motion was to present 
evidence to the Court, unknown and unobtainable at the time of 
trial, which was extremely germane to the proceeding. The 
acceptance by Mrs. Tipton of the tax liability on the Sierra 
Pacific distributions (R, 130) belies her allegations that she 
was not a partner, and essentially stipulates to the underlying 
issue of the partnership question discussed above, i.e., the 
income tax liability on funds received. 
Based upon the standards discussed above, the Court's 
ruling is clothed with a presumption of validity. Boyles, 
Argyle, Savage, supra. However, this presumption is overcome by 
a showing of an abuse of discretion or that the evidence 
preponderates against the Court's ruling. Thompson, Fletcher, 
Turner, supra. 
Defendant should prevail here under either standard. 
It was an abuse of the Court's discretion to refuse to consider 
Defendant's written acceptance of the tax liability on the Sierra 
Pacific disbursements. Certainly this kind of written, competent 
evidence, which may be dispositive, should be allowed if at all 
possible. If it is not to be considered, the least Defendant 
should be entitled to is an explanation—in the form of 
sufficient findings — of why not. Furthermore, the existence of 
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the document and its contents preponderates against the Court's 
ruling. The mere denial of the motion, without more, should 
presumptively entitle Defendant to relief under this standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the trial Court's 
decision of May 9, 1985 and a finding by this Court that a 
partnership existed between the parties. Furthermore, Defendant 
seeks this Court's reversal of the trial Court's order of May 20, 
1986. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this, the j 2 day of November, 
1986. 
Peter W. Guyon f 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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